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## The Social Impacts of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Croatia: 1991–2011<sup>1</sup>

### SUMMARY

The paper explores the social impacts of emigration and rural-urban migration in Croatia, focusing on the period from 1991 to 2011. In this period, Croatia has experienced conflict and post-conflict-induced population movements, followed by a period of normalization of migration flows. The paper explores, in detail, labour migration and impacts on labour markets, in the context of skills shortages in Croatia. The role of remittances and social security agreements are also addressed. The paper addresses the problems of institutional support and of migration policy, making a series of recommendations for policy makers to minimize the social costs of migration and, instead, ensure that migration contributes to social development.

KEY WORDS: emigration, internal migration, social impacts, labour markets, Croatia

### INTRODUCTION

This paper focuses on the social and economic impacts of emigration, departing from the usual emphasis on migration through a justice, home affairs and security lens. It also focuses on the impacts of emigration back home rather than on the “integration” of immigrants in their country of migration. The paper addresses the social impacts of movements of population regardless as to whether they are across international borders or internal, mainly rural-urban, migration. It is both analytical

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<sup>1</sup> This is a shortened version of one of 25 Country Reports which, together with a Synthesis Report, derive from a study commissioned by the European Commission, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion on The Social Impacts of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe (VT/2010/001). The contractor was Gesellschaft für Versicherungswissenschaft und Gestaltung e.V., Cologne, Germany (GVG) and the original report has been published at <http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlOSServlet?docId=8866&langId=en>. The opinions expressed in the text are those of the authors and do not represent the official position of the European Commission.

and prescriptive, with a focus on the ways in which the negative socio-economic impacts of migration can be minimized and, indeed, how migration can contribute to sustainable development, creating a kind of “triple win” situation for the migrant, the country or region to which s/he migrates, and the country or region from which s/he has migrated. The long-term focus of the report is, primarily, from Croatian independence onwards. The report is one of 25 Country Reports which were outputs of a European Commission funded study on The Social Impacts of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe. Each study followed the same broad structure. The broad aims of the study, as stated in the Synthesis Report were to provide “a comparative knowledge assessment on international and internal migration in Central and Eastern Europe and a policy-oriented analysis of the impacts of migration on employment and the social and territorial cohesion of the migration source countries in the region in the last two decades”. Here the authors present a shortened version of the Croatia country report providing, firstly, a broad socio-economic overview; secondly, the main emigration and internal migration trends; thirdly, the impacts of migration on labour market and social development trends; and, finally, a summary of key challenges and policy implications.

## **SOCIO-ECONOMIC OVERVIEW**

### **Demographic developments**

Independent Croatia held a full population census in 1991, 2001, and 2011, albeit with a different methodology each time, not least relating to those absent at the time of the census, making reliable comparisons difficult. Croatia’s recorded population declined between 1991 and 2001 by some 2.9%, from 4,784,265 in 1991 to 4,437,460 in 2001<sup>2</sup>. Results of the census of 2011 are that Croatia has a population of 4,284,889. The total number of enumerated persons was 4,456,096<sup>3</sup>. If the same methodology had been used in 2011 as in 2001, Croatia would have approximately the same population in both censi. A study on the likely trends in the Croatian population between 2004 and 2051 (Grizelj and Akrap, 2006) predicts sharp declines in the Croatian population of between 470,000 (given high fertility and medium migration) and 830,000 (low fertility and medium migration) or between 10.5% and 18.8%. Even in high migration projection scenarios, the impact of migration in the future is forecast to be rather low. As Figure 1 shows, the working age po-

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<sup>2</sup> The methodology for the 2001 census was changed. If the same methodology had been used as in the 1991 census, the Croatian population would be 4,492,049 (*Statistički ljetopis Republike Hrvatske/Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Croatia: 2010*, Zagreb, DZS, 2010, Table 5-1).

<sup>3</sup> [http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv\\_Eng/publication/2011/SI-1441.pdf](http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv_Eng/publication/2011/SI-1441.pdf) (12 January 2012).

pulation is set to fall dramatically over time and the dependency ratio to increase significantly.

For EU administrative purposes Croatia has two NUTS II regions: Continental Croatia and Adriatic Croatia. At NUTS III level there are 21 counties (*županije*) of regional self-government, including the City of Zagreb. Below this are municipalities (*općine*), including towns or cities (*gradovi*) and, in a recent change to the law, larger cities (*veliki gradovi*). There are currently 556 units of local self-government, including 429 municipalities, many of which have less than 1,000 population, and 127 towns or cities, which have 10,000 population or more. Larger cities are those with a population of 35,000 or more. Croatia has rather low levels of decentralization with the proportion of income and expenditure of local government 7.0% and 7.6% of GDP respectively in 2009, compared to 12.0% and 12.3% for the EU-27 (Babić et al., 2010: 132–133).

Croatia has a population density of 75.8 inhabitants/sq. km, with a range from 9.5 inhabitants/sq. km in Ličko-Senjska county to 156.9 in Međimurska, and 1236.9 in the City of Zagreb. Croatia does not have a definition of rural and urban areas. Using the OECD criteria of a threshold of 150 inhabitants/sq. km, 47.6% of the population lived in rural areas in 2001 and 52.4% in urban areas (MAFRD, 2009: 10).

### **Economic development, labour markets and poverty and social exclusion**

After a dramatic decline in GDP during war-time, Croatia began to grow in the mid- to late-1990s and has grown more than the EU average but less than many of its neighbours, throughout the last decade. The economic and financial crisis hit in the middle of 2008, with GDP falling -5.8% in 2009. Eurostat data show Croatia's GDP at PPP in 2008 as €16,000, about 64% of the EU-27, rising slightly to 65% in 2009<sup>4</sup>. In terms of GDP per capita by county the richest county, the City of Zagreb, had 1.8 times the per capita GDP of the poorest county Brodsko-posavska in 2005.

The Croatian economy has been characterised since independence by rather low overall labour market participation. Using the LFS data from 2009 (*Rezultati ankete o radnoj snazi*, 2010), compared to the EU-27 employment rate<sup>5</sup> of 64.6% (58.6% for women and 70.7% for men), Croatia had an employment rate of only 56.6% (51.0% for women and 62.4% for men). In terms of progress towards key EU 2020 targets, Croatia faces a difficult task to meet the targets on employment rate, and the proportion of 30 to 34 year olds having completed tertiary education.

<sup>4</sup> [http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics\\_explained/index.php?title=File:Volume\\_indices\\_per\\_inhabitant,\\_2007-2009.PNG&filetimestamp=20110120133458](http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:Volume_indices_per_inhabitant,_2007-2009.PNG&filetimestamp=20110120133458) (6 October 2011).

<sup>5</sup> Proportion of those aged 15–64 in employment as a proportion of the total 15–64 population.

Looking at employment based on the classifications used in the Labour Force Survey, namely Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing; Industry; and Services, the low numbers employed in agriculture, compared to those self-employed or as family workers, and the large proportion of part-time workers in the sector, indicates the dominance of small scale and subsistence work in the sector. The decline in the proportion of the active population involved in agriculture can be traced from 1961 when it was 50.6% to 1971 (40.3%) and 1981, although the classification changed (22.3%) (Wertheimer-Baletić, 1991). Whilst the classification again changed in the meantime, by the time of the 2001 census only 7.9% of the active population was involved in agriculture, forestry and fishing (*Popis stanovništva 2001*).

Interesting comparisons are made between Croatia and the, then, EU-25 in Croatia's Agricultural and Rural Development Plan (MAFRD, 2009: 156–157). Whilst 7.3% of the Croatian population worked in agriculture compared to the EU-25's 5.2%, agriculture contributed 6.5% of GDP in Croatia compared to 1.6% in the EU-25. The average farm size in Croatia was only 2.4 ha compared to 13.5 ha in the EU-25. Only 19% of available land is used for agriculture compared to 42% in the EU-25.

The latest headline figure on at-risk-of-poverty in Croatia, based on 2010 SILC data, using 60% of median income, including income in kind, is 20.6%<sup>6</sup>, higher than previous Household Budget survey data had shown. Children 0–17 had an at-risk-of-poverty rate of 20.5%. Poverty risk was highest for those aged 65 and over, at 28.1%, with significant gender variation: 23.3% for men and 31.3% for women. By household type, high at-risk-of-poverty rates are faced by single person households (44.8%); single parent households with dependent children (34.6%); households with three or more children (33.1%); and single person households aged over 65 (50.2%). As noted below, poverty rates are higher in areas which have experienced out migration. In the 2010 SILC data, Croatia had levels of material deprivation at 32.2%, including 57.2% of those at-risk-of-poverty and 25.7% of those not at-risk-of-poverty. A recent Quality of Life survey gives a sense of levels of material deprivation, based on an index consisting of six items (European Foundation, 2009). The Croatian sample showed 63% of households lacking at least one of the items, a rate more comparable to the NMS-12 than the other candidate countries which had rates of 83% (Turkey) and 85% (Macedonia) respectively. When counties are ranked on different indicators, a clear picture emerges of the war-affected counties being the most deprived.

<sup>6</sup> [http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv\\_Eng/publication/2011/14-01-02\\_01\\_2011.htm](http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv_Eng/publication/2011/14-01-02_01_2011.htm) (12 January 2012). If Croatia were already a Member State, this would mean that it would have the fifth highest poverty rate in the EU.

## MAIN EMIGRATION AND INTERNAL MIGRATION TRENDS AND PATTERNS

In general terms we can speak of three main periods of emigration and rural-urban<sup>7</sup> migration in Croatia since 1991, as follows:

### *A Periodisation of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Croatia*

Period	Pattern	Description
1991–1995	Conflict	Dissolution of Yugoslavia; ethnicised conflicts; wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina; refugee and IDP crisis
1996–2000	Post-conflict	Human rights and discrimination; reintegration of territory; stabilisation of emigration and return flows
2001–2010	Normalisation	Regular, economic emigration and return; circular migration

In the first period (1991–1995), the conflicts in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina led to an outflow of refugees from Croatia, some to neighbouring Serbia as well as to “third countries”, depending upon a range of factors, notably the existence of an extant Croatian population, family reunion, and/or the nature of different countries’ refugee and asylum regimes. Most of the refugees were ethnic Serbs, leaving in significant numbers during and after the military actions in May and August 1995, mainly to Serbia.

In the second, post-conflict period (1996–2000), the reintegration of territory and the focus on return contrasted, somewhat, with continued problems of emigration of those facing discrimination and human rights abuses. Hence, whilst ethnic Croats returned in significant numbers to territories reintegrated under Croatian government control, both from abroad and from other parts of Croatia, the exodus of ethnic Serbs tended to continue.

The normalization of migration flows after 2000<sup>8</sup> coincided with the relative normalization of life in Croatia. Programmes were developed to facilitate the return

<sup>7</sup> After the 2001 Census, terminology concerning “rural-urban” migration changed to “urban and non-urban migration” (*Model diferencijacije urbanih...*, 2011: 1).

<sup>8</sup> The surprising negative crude rate of net migration for the year 2000 (Table 1) is most probably the result of adjustment and consequently of recalibration of data both in Eurostat and Croatian statistics. There is also a possibility of a mistake, because this rate is highly inconsistent with Croatian official data on immigration in 2000.

of the Serbian population to war-affected territories which, whilst partly successful, tended to involve older people returning more than the active age population, still concerned by the lack of general economic prospects and the threat of discrimination.

### Main emigration trends

Our analysis of “emigration stock” here refers to the stock of population abroad described as “citizens of Croatia by country of residence outside Croatia” in respective censuses.<sup>9</sup> Persons born in Croatia but residing out of Croatia, who are not Croatian citizens, are not addressed in this analysis. The main residence countries for Croatian citizens in Europe, updated for 2008, were as follows: Germany (239,961), Austria (56,695), Switzerland (37,998), and Italy (21,308) (Kupiszewski, 2009: 122). Therefore Germany is the country which will mostly be in the focus of this analysis.

When a comparison is made between Croatian official statistics on emigration – for instance to Germany – and German statistics on immigration from Croatia for the same year (2009), it is evident that Croatian statistics lead to a significant under-estimation of the emigration stock of Croatians. Although the basis of each calculation is different, the discrepancy between Croatian data and German data is in most cases significant.

As a result of independence, war and transition, the period between 1991 and 2000 was a turbulent decade regarding migration into and out of Croatia<sup>10</sup>. Related to the war, emigration was particularly high in 1991, 1995, and 1996; immigration, largely of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina, was high in 1993 (Table 1). The period from 2001 onwards has witnessed much smaller flows, with eight successive years of very small positive net migration followed in 2009 by a slight negative net migration (Table 2). The 2009 and 2010 figures are the result of a 40% reduction in the number of immigrants to Croatia, which is probably related to the impacts of the global economic and financial crisis, not least in terms of a significant reduction in the demand for foreign labour in the building, construction and service sectors in Croatia (see Table 2). The impacts of the war in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina are complex, with data questionable not least since, for much of the 1990s, large

<sup>9</sup> Census 2001 includes 8 questions (36 variables) concerning population abroad and 4 questions (11 variables) related to immigrants from abroad.

<sup>10</sup> Croatia has no Register of Population; data are estimated on the basis of the Register of Permanent Residence combined with data about the actual state of residence of persons on specific addresses of the Ministry of Interior and with registers based on lists of voters within Croatia and abroad (*Migracija stanovništva Republike Hrvatske u 2010/Migration of Population of Republic of Croatia, 2010*, Priopćenje, no. 7.1.2., 15 June 2011, p. 1).

parts of Croatia were not under Croatian government control. Military actions in 1995 which returned parts of Croatia to Government control resulted in a new wave of forced migration and subsequent return, a process still not completed today. Even in 1998, the peaceful reintegration of Eastern Slavonia nevertheless led to an exodus of a proportion of the Serbian population. Subsequently, patterns of emigration can be said to have “normalized”, although there remain features of involuntary migration insofar as many movements are a result of continued discrimination and lack of sustainable livelihood conditions for members of the Serbian minority, through a combination of lack of employment opportunities and the continuing problem of landmines. Whilst estimates vary considerably, the total emigration connected with the war in the 1990s is about 11% of the total population in the region of 510,000. Some 270,000 ethnic Serbs emigrated to Serbia and to Bosnia-Herzegovina and some 240,000 emigrated elsewhere, mainly to Western Europe (Nejašmić, 2008: 113). At the same time, there were significant numbers of internally displaced within Croatia as well as temporary refugees from the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, some of whom obtained Croatian citizenship. The most accurate demographic data seems to be that the net migration balance for this period is negative by some 247,000 (Gelo, Akrap and Čipin, 2005).

What is clear is that, barring unforeseen circumstances, the high rates of migration which characterised the 1990s are now over. Croatia has consolidated political and economic reforms, is stable, and has control over the whole of its territory. As a future EU member state, Croatia closed Chapter 2 of the *Treaty concerning the Accession of the Republic of Croatia* on free movement of persons<sup>11</sup>. The provisions concerning movement of the labour force include a 2+3+2 arrangement, meaning that for the first two years after joining the EU, the labour force from Croatia would have access to EU labour markets on the basis of a default clause of limitations and on the basis of bilateral arrangements. For the last years for which data are available (2009 and 2010), of the total regarded by the Croatian Bureau of Statistics as having emigrated from Croatia, almost two thirds departed to the countries of former Yugoslavia (Tables 3 and 4). Looking at a longer time period, we can conclude that there have been, and to an extent still are, two main destination clusters in terms of emigration from Croatia. One is regional, to the Yugoslav successor states, particularly Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. This migration is, often, based on national and ethnic identification and family ties, but also includes a degree of labour market migration. The second is to the European Union, including the new member states, as well as Switzerland. Although a small proportion of this may be based on

<sup>11</sup> “Freedom of Movement for Persons, Annex 1, 14509/11”, in: *Treaty concerning the Accession of the Republic of Croatia*, Brussels, Council of the European Union, 21 September 2011, 14509/11, pp. 140–146, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/11/st14/st14509.en11.pdf> (10 March 2012).



national and ethnic affiliation, the largest part is labour migration either directly or indirectly. As noted above, Germany is still the EU member state with the largest stock of emigrants from Croatia; sex and age structure of Croatian population in Germany shows that in 2009, just over half of all emigrants in Germany, were older women (Tables 5 and 6).

Table 4 shows international migration out of, and into, Croatia in 2009 and 2010, in terms of country of previous residence/destination and citizenship. Some 68% of all immigration<sup>12</sup> and some 62% of all emigration was to the countries of former Yugoslavia, not including Slovenia, with the largest number of immigrants coming from Bosnia-Herzegovina and the largest number of emigrants leaving to Serbia. Only around 20.5% of immigration is from the EU and slightly less than 10% of emigration is to the EU, with the largest exchange in both directions being with Germany. In contrast to the period of large-scale labour emigration to Western Europe from the 1960s to the early 1980s (when migration streams became dominated by family reunification), there are now significant controls on labour migration to Western Europe from outside the EU which helps to explain the rather low numbers in the last decade.

A look at numbers of international migrants broken down by county shows that in 2009, the largest number of emigrants, 13.5% of the total, was from Sisačko-moslavačka county, followed by the City of Zagreb (9.1%) and Brodsko-posavska county (8.3%). If we look at trends in the four largest net migration loss counties overall between 1991 and 2001, we see that three of these counties – Sisačko-moslavačka, Karlovačka and Ličko-senjska – subsequently also lost population through international migration between 2005 and 2009, whereas Šibensko-kninska tended to gain population until the trend was reversed in 2009. In general terms, a trend is emerging in which those counties bordering Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina have both the largest negative net internal and net international migration (Table 3).

Overall, in terms of the EU and European cluster, the main countries of destination remained as they had been before independence: namely Germany, Austria and Switzerland (Tables 4 and 5). Slovenia's status, in particular, is not clear yet, in terms of whether flows concomitant on the break-up of Yugoslavia are still in effect or whether new patterns are emerging.

### **Main internal migration trends**

In the period between 1945 and 1991, there was a significant depopulation of rural settlements and high levels of rural-urban migration in Croatia. Between 1981

<sup>12</sup> Data on immigrants to Croatia (including "returnees" to Croatia) comprised also "foreigners" and persons of "unknown" residence and destination.

and 1991, some workers employed abroad returned to Croatia, mainly to urban settlements. After 1991, rural-urban migration trends were rather weak. Indeed, the stabilisation of the rural population can be said to have begun in the decade 1981–1991, when rural areas lost only 5% of their inhabitants. The war between 1991 and 1995 interrupted this stabilisation, intensifying depopulation in the war-affected territories, particularly in rural areas. Between 1991 and 2001, it has been calculated that non-urban<sup>13</sup> areas lost 120,652 residents (Nejašmić and Štambuk, 2003: 479). Whilst this is significant, representing around 2.5% of the 1991 population, it should be remembered that the overall population of Croatia fell by over 350,000 in the same period. Altogether, both areas lost population, non-urban areas more than urban, since they were more exposed to war from 1991 to 1995.

It seems that negative rates of natural change are much higher in rural areas than in the overall population; the negative net migration balance is twice as high as in the general population, and the lack of inhabitants in the 20–54 age group is pronounced (Nejašmić and Štambuk, 2003: 491–492). Within the 20–54 age group in rural areas, there are fewer women than men. Hence, it has been suggested recently, rural-urban migration, though weak, has been gendered, with “women ... leaving sooner and in larger numbers” (Nejašmić and Štambuk, 2003: 481). Thus the rural population left behind is homogenized in terms of a very low birth-rate, a stable and high death-rate, and a higher proportion of men. In non-urban settlements in the most important age group for reproduction and work, namely between 20 and 29 years of age, there are only 91.7 women for every 100 men. In the medium-term, hypothetically, this imbalance could induce a more significant emigration of younger men from rural areas and subsequently set up a vicious circle so that, in turn, more young women leave<sup>14</sup>.

<sup>13</sup> The model for the differentiation of urban, rural and semi-urban settlements in Croatia has been used by the Croatian Bureau of Statistics (CBS) in the 2001 Census. This model refers to definitions of urban vs. semi-urban and rural areas put forward by the UN Demographic Yearbook 2006. According to the Yearbook and Methodological Guidelines 2011 of CBS (*Model diferencijacije urbanih...*, 2011: 11), urban settlements in Croatia include: (1) all settlements that are seats of administrative towns regardless of the number of inhabitants (2) all settlements with population over 10,000 (3) settlements with population between 5,000 – 9,999 inhabitants, and with more than 25% employed (4) settlements with the population between 2,000 – 4,999 inhabitants with more than 25% employed in their place of residence. According to the 2001 Census, “urban settlements” were those with administrative and employment functions which had more than 2,000 inhabitants (*Model diferencijacije urbanih...*, 2011: 13-14). “All other settlements that do not meet the abovementioned criteria are considered rural and semi-urban settlements. This group includes villages and other, less and more urbanised settlements in rural areas, as well as suburban settlements” (*Model diferencijacije urbanih...*, 2011: 13). Consequently, Census 2001 identified 143 urban settlements in Croatia with 53.6% of the total Croatian population (*Model diferencijacije urbanih...*, 2011: 19).

<sup>14</sup> It can be doubted that the gender imbalance would cause such a cycle. If men stayed because of good work prospects, the imbalance would cause a reverse movement in the future. However, recent data on internal migration do not support such speculation: in 2010 “the largest number of migrated population within the Republic of Croatia was aged 20–39 (47.7%), while the share of women in the total number of migrated

A particularly important feature of the Croatian migration pattern is the linkage between international emigration and rural-urban migration. In the period of the greatest depopulation of rural areas, between 1961 and 1971, when rural areas lost 557,500 people, it can be seen that the rural population assumed two major migration directions: the dominant one, towards large Croatian cities, and the other towards abroad (Akrap, 2004: 680), mainly to European countries. According to the 1971 census, of the 256,334 persons who resided or worked abroad, 78.6% were from rural settlements. Out of the total of 224,722 persons employed abroad, 42.7% were farmers and 35.2% industrial workers before emigration (Akrap, 2004: 680–682). This bifurcation of migration also occurred in the 1970s but with a lower intensity, and the economic crisis in 1973 stopped temporarily the emigration of the work force whilst inducing family reunion and a rise in marriages. In the 1960s, the majority of emigrants who left Croatia were young single males.

Comparative analysis of the natural permanent population trend (the sum of inhabitants in Croatia and registered persons temporarily working and living abroad with their family members) and the population in Croatia at the level of rural and urban settlements based on census and other data from 1961–2001 showed that the emigration between 1961–1971 “quickened the pace of deagrarianisation and deruralisation considerably more than could have been done by the domestic economy” (Akrap, 2004: 698). As a consequence, the depopulation in rural areas in Croatia from the 1990s onwards can be said to have been induced by the depopulation by emigration in the 1960s and 1970s (Wertheimer-Baletić, 2004; Nejašmić and Štambuk, 2003).

Dispersed small settlements with a weak supportive logistics network were not attractive enough to retain the rural population. There was no developed system of micro-regional or regional centres which would neutralize the strong push factors for the rural population to leave their settlements (Nejašmić and Štambuk, 2003: 471–472). The dispersivity of small non-urban settlements is evident from the 2001 census data: out of a total of 6,759 settlements, only 143 were classified as “urban”. The great majority among the rest of the 6,616 non-urban settlements were villages and semi-urban settlements (Nejašmić and Štambuk, 2003: 473). Overall, emigration from, and depopulation of, non-urban settlements led to a significant decrease in the proportion of those living in non-urban settlements in the total population. It was 56.3% in 1971, falling to 44% in 2001, with expectations of a further fall to around 40% in the 2011 census.

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population was 55.2%” and has been growing since the mid-1990s (*Migracija stanovništva Republike Hrvatske u 2010/Migration of Population of Republic of Croatia, 2010*, Priopćenje, no. 7.1.2., 15 June 2011, p. 1).

The nature of trends in net migration loss regions is also important. Between 1991 and 2001, 18 out of 21 counties lost population and only three, Zagrebačka, Brodsko-posavska and Splitsko-dalmatinska displayed a natural growth of population (Wertheimer-Baletić, 2004: 640). Interestingly, whilst Zagrebačka county gained the most, some 10%, the City of Zagreb itself grew only 0.3% which, compared to earlier censi, represented a “notable slowing down of population growth” (Antić, 2001: 308). This was surprising, because war-induced internal migration between 1991 and 1995 directed the majority of refugees and IDPs to Zagreb. However, it has been argued that “this flow was not accompanied with permanent settlement” (Antić, 2001: 308).

### **Main characteristics of emigrants in 2009**

As noted above, Croatia as part of SFRY experienced a long period of regular emigration for a variety of economic reasons between 1961 and 1981. This wave of emigration included temporary migration and guest workers’ permanent labour migration based on subjective economic utility as well as family reunification. In over 25 years of migration flows before 1990, Croatia sent hundreds of thousands of guest workers to Western Europe, at its height supplying 30% of former Yugoslavia’s foreign currency reserves. Table 6 shows the Croatian population in Germany between 2002 and 2009, showing a slight decline in this period and a slight change in gender distribution so that women are now a slight majority (51.4%).<sup>15</sup> Table 7 shows the 2009 Croatian population in Germany in terms of its age structure. Almost a quarter of the entire population is aged between 55 and 65, with a dramatic fall to only 11% aged 65 to 75. Whereas there are more women in the 55–65 group, men predominate in the 65–75 group. This may be a product of the different gender basis of initial emigration of different cohorts.<sup>16</sup> The figures may also indicate a trend of a significant number of Croats in Germany returning to Croatia upon retirement, in which case the most significant wave of returns is imminent.

Compared to the resident population in Croatia, emigrants who are citizens of Croatia in the EU member states are older, better educated, have the same share of women as the resident population and approximately the same proportion, about one third, is single. These are characteristics for the emigration flow to EU countries as displayed by Croatian emigration statistics. Receiving country data from Germany are analysed in more detail, as most Croatians in the EU live there. It can

<sup>15</sup> Over one fifth of Croatian citizens in Germany are not emigrants but are born in Germany (22%).

<sup>16</sup> Recent immigrants (including first entrants) from Croatia to Germany show a quite different picture. Out of 4,985 persons who came to Germany in 2009, the majority were men (66%) and they were young (69% between 25–45 years of age, and 42% between 25 and 35 years old). The average age was 34.4 years old, being higher for men (35.1) compared to women (32.5).

be assumed that the structural characteristics for most other receiving countries are similar; Germany showed a slight decline in the 2002 – 2009 period and a slight change in gender distribution so that women are now a slight majority (51.4%).

As noted above, women represent 51% of Croatian emigrants in Germany, a rate which has been growing steadily (Table 5). The stock of Croatian emigrants in Germany is relatively old; 38% are over 55 years of age, with women being slightly younger than men. There is also a significant proportion of the generation of young, active emigrants (25–45 years). They represent 37% of the total population of Croatian citizens in Germany. The average age for men is 45.3 and for women 45.1 (Table 6). The length of stay in Germany is also quite long: on average, in 2009, it was 28.2 years for men and 27.3 years for women. Whilst the majority are married (51%), more women are married (56%) than men (45.7%). The legal status through residence in Germany for the vast majority of Croatian citizens is regulated, for the majority before 1990, according to the old law on the status of migrants, and for others afterwards, by 2004 regulations. According to the 2004 regulations, 74% of Croatian emigrants have permission to live permanently in Germany. Those who emigrated from Germany to Croatia in 2009 have rather different demographic features<sup>17</sup>. These emigrants (returnees)<sup>18</sup> to Croatia are considerably older (47.7 years on average, upon returning home), with women significantly older than men (52.6 compared to 45.9). Within the entire stock of returnees in 2009, 38% of persons were over 55 years old upon returning. Younger persons (25–45) also represent a significant portion of returnees (36.7%). This bifurcation is possibly due to the circulation of younger migrants and/or to the economic crisis in 2007/8. In any case, returnees had rather a long period of permanent stay in Germany before returning (19.7 years on average).

<sup>17</sup> These figures most probably include persons who did not immigrate to Germany from Croatia, such as former Yugoslavia nationals with Croatian passports.

<sup>18</sup> Data on immigrants to Croatia (including “returnees” to Croatia) do not include only citizens of Croatia. They comprise also “foreigners” and persons of “unknown” residence and destination. Also, figures concerning those who emigrated from Germany to Croatia include emigrants who are not former immigrants from Croatia (*Migracija stanovništva Republike Hrvatske u 2010/Migration of Population of Republic of Croatia, 2010*, Priopćenje, no. 7.1.2., 15 June 2011, [http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv\\_Eng/publication/2011/07-01-02\\_01\\_2011.htm](http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv_Eng/publication/2011/07-01-02_01_2011.htm)).

## NATIONWIDE LABOUR MARKET AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT TRENDS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF MIGRATION

### Economic and labour market developments

It is difficult to isolate the impacts of emigration from other factors in terms of labour market impacts and social development trends. Nevertheless, the scale of two major waves of emigration, the first of guest workers mainly to Germany and other parts of Europe from the 1960s onwards, and the second, the wave of forced migration out of Croatia as a result of the war in the early 1990s, as well as the uneven nature of return subsequently, have had significant effects. In terms of the profile of Croatians in Germany at the end of 2009, 80.5% were between 15 and 65, constituting a significant addition to the Croatian labour force if they were in Croatia (Table 6). The extent of labour emigration combined with very low rates of immigration and a rather inflexible labour market in terms of internal movement for work clearly contributes to problems in the establishment of a dynamic labour market in Croatia. Emigration between the 1960s and 1980s was linked to relieving the pressure on the labour market and limiting levels of unemployment. Subsequently, in the 1990s, such pressure was countered in other ways, with significant long-term impacts, notably the granting of early retirement to large numbers of workers in the 1990s. Whilst high rates of unemployment, particularly long-term, persisted in the new millennium and worsened during the economic and financial crisis, this has had no appreciable impact on rates of emigration in general although, as the authors note below, there have been impacts in particular sectors of the economy.

There are a number of labour market and skills shortages in specific economic sectors in Croatia which appear to have a link to emigration insofar as it is known that there are significant numbers of Croatians working in those same sectors abroad. In shipbuilding, as a result of the war, Croatia lost orders and lost the place it had as third in the world in terms of weight of boats produced which it held in 1987. Whilst those employed in the shipbuilding industry were around 21,900 in 1990 (Barisic, 2008: 24), this dropped to a low of 8,698 in 1997 (Kersan-Škabić, 2002). The number of employees has risen steadily since, from 13,952 in 2000 to 16,445 in 2007 (HGK, 2008), with the majority working in the five major shipyards which are currently in the process of restructuring and privatisation. The decline in employment in the early 1990s meant that a significant number of skilled workers found work abroad, where wages were higher, particularly in neighbouring Italy. A “core” of the skilled labour force was lost to emigration during the war with as many as 2,600 highly skilled shipbuilding workers in Italy (Skupnjak-Kapić et al., 2005: 12), a significant proportion of whom were recruited through Croatian sub-

contracting companies or worked illegally. The drain of Croatian shipyard workers can be seen from the fact that, in the three largest shipyards surveyed, some 16,000 workers left between 1990 and 2003. The annual employment quota for new employment of foreigners in shipbuilding in 2004 was 409, and in 2009 it was 1,148, reduced to 243 in 2010.

In the construction industry the highest number of new quota work permits, 2,518, was issued for foreign workers coming to work in Croatia in 2009, although this was reduced as a result of the crisis to 300 in 2010. Foreign workers in this sector are mainly bricklayers and carpenters. Employment in construction fell dramatically during the war. In 1990 some 118,700 persons were employed in construction, around 7.6% of the employed in Croatia. By 1995, this fell to some 59,000 or 4.9% of the workforce. By 2000, the number picked up to 65,200 or 6.2% (Đukan and Đukan, 2002). HGK figures suggest that, by 2008, employment figures had almost returned to pre-war levels at 108,260, falling in the context of the economic crisis to 97,503 in 2009 (HGK, 2010: 2). Although data is scarce, the studies noted suggest that a significant number of Croatian construction workers work abroad, on temporary or more permanent contracts, in Western Europe, in neighbouring countries in South East Europe, and elsewhere. Crucially, according to 2008 data in an unpublished study, 71% of 50–64 year olds in Croatia who are registered as construction workers are inactive, with significant numbers retiring every year, and too few schools training their replacements (Crnković-Pozaić and Meštrović, 2011). There are suggestions that tourism is a sector marked by some seasonal labour emigration and labour shortages, particularly of cooks and waiters (Pavic, 2010). In any case, tourism is the third largest sector for the issuing of work permit quotas: 160 ordinary permits and 10 seasonal permits in 2009 and 138 ordinary plus 20 seasonal permits in 2010 (Vlada Republike Hrvatske, 2009).

There are suggestions that, in fact, in these three industries the quota of work permits may have been too low and that some employees used business permits instead (Pavic, 2010). In addition, many of those foreigners found to be working in irregular work, each year between about 1,600 and 2,800, worked in construction, tourism and seasonal agriculture. In any case, the rigidity, lack of mobility, skills mismatch, and segmentation of the domestic labour market are combined with a rather low population of foreign migrant workers, some 10,669 in 2009, 91% of whom are male, in a total of 32,160 regular migrants (Pavic, 2010: 53–56). In this sense, in the context of a relatively high unemployment, it can be argued that emigrations may have eased general labour market pressures.

In terms of the emigration of highly skilled professionals and scientists, whilst there are clear indications of a significant number of those with PhDs and masters

degrees leaving Croatia during the 1990s, it is harder to show the impact in terms of labour market shortages. The estimation is that by 2004 there were around one thousand highly qualified persons in reputable world universities and research corporations (Pifat-Mrzljak, Juroš and Vizek-Vidović, 2004). In the period between 1990 and 2000, it is estimated that 849 scientists left Croatia, mainly from the natural and technical sciences. The reasons for the exodus of young scientists appear to be multiple and complex, although many relate to dissatisfaction with the status of science in Croatia and lack of prospects within a hierarchical system (Golub, 2003).

The issue of emigration of qualified doctors from Croatia has been raised on a number of occasions in political debate, although research tends to focus on intention to leave rather than on those who actually leave (cf. Kolčić et al., 2005). Some research (Džakula et al., 2006) noted high levels of unemployment in the 1990s but reported shortages in 2005. In October 2005, there were 1,107 registered unemployed medical personnel in Croatia, including 437 medical doctors, but most of these were in the process of internship after graduation and therefore did not have a medical licence. There is some level of migration abroad but also migration to other professions by skilled medical personnel. One text (Adamović and Mežnarić, 2003) states that, in the 1990s, some 139 medical scientists left the country.

In terms of remittances, Inward Remittance flows including workers' remittances, employees' compensation and migrants' transfers was estimated at \$1.513 billion in 2010 (approximately €1142.3 billion using average yearly exchange rates). The figure for 2009 was \$1.476 billion (€1061.2 billion) or 2.34% of GDP (*Migration and Remittances Factbook*, 2011). Trends over time as a proportion of GDP (Figure 2), suggest that, at their peak, remittances were 3.35% of GDP in 2002. The fall in absolute terms between 2008 and 2009, whilst not very significant, probably relates to the global economic and financial crisis although, as figure 2 shows, there was actually a slight rise in remittances as a percentage of GDP since overall GDP fell. Whilst relatively low by regional standards as a proportion of GDP, Croatia's remittances represent about three times the value of net Overseas Development Aid (ODA), and around 30% of net Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows. Whilst there is a widespread agreement that official figures significantly underestimate the total flow of remittances in the region of Eastern Europe (cf. Mansoor and Quillin, 2006), there are no estimates of by how much in the Croatian case. The amounts are probably significant as the majority of remittances come from Germany which is not so distant and with good travel connections to Croatia (Schioapu and Siegfried, 2006: 29). The same report shows that remittances to Croatia in 2004 tended to be higher from countries with a higher GDP, and that there was a clear negative



relationship between the level of remittances per migrant and the proportion of low skilled migrants from Croatia in each country (Schiopu and Siegfried, 2006: 17).

The role of remittances in development in Croatia has not been studied systematically. Nevertheless, in the context of general development planning in Croatia, and particularly in the context of rural and island development planning, there are examples of remittances supporting small-scale development. This has also occurred in cases of large-scale emigration from specific localities to one or two places, so that the Diaspora is encouraged, sometimes through mediating authorities such as the Catholic Church, to provide income for local projects. The small islands of Unije (cf. Magaš, Faričić and Lončarić, 2006; Starc, 2004)) and, even more particularly, Susak, where a whole generation of active young people left for the United States in the 1950s, offer interesting similar examples (Sokolić, 1994). In both cases, renovations to church and community infrastructure, as well as roads facilitating tourism, have been developed with funding coming, in part at least, from the Diaspora.

### **Social security**

Croatia has a number of bilateral agreements on social security in place which enable pensions to be paid on the basis of aggregate contribution years. Other principles include: equal treatment, determination of applicable legislation, time based proportionality, exportability of benefits with no restrictions, equivalence of territories to avoid overlap, and maintenance of rights acquired (Council of Europe, 2009). Some agreements were made by SFRY but have been taken over by Croatia pending the signing of new agreements. In addition, Croatia has signed bilateral agreements with five successor states of the SFRY. In total, as at April 2011, there are 24 bilateral country agreements, plus an agreement with the Canadian province of Quebec, with a number of other agreements being negotiated<sup>19</sup>. Once completed, these will cover the main countries of Croatian emigration. In addition, upon EU accession, the EU rules for social security co-ordination among all member states will also apply to Croatia. The accession treaty of Croatia with the EU ensures the exportability of social security benefits on the basis of reciprocity between Croatia and the nationals of all EU member states.

The agreements with European countries apply to almost all aspects of social security: health insurance and medical care; occupational injuries; old age, disability

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<sup>19</sup> The countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxemburg, Macedonia, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Quebec province, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. The agreement with Turkey has been signed and ratified but not yet in force. Negotiations are also being undertaken with New Zealand, Chile, Argentina, and Romania.

and survivors' pensions; and unemployment benefits. Some also cover death grants and family benefits. Agreements with overseas countries apply only to pension schemes. Croatia also has fourteen bilateral agreements covering family benefits<sup>20</sup>. These vary in terms of whether or not they totalise relevant periods completed in different countries.

Under these agreements, Croatia pays pensions to those who worked in Croatia but who now live abroad and other countries pay those who worked in those countries and have now returned to Croatia. In terms of the payment of Croatian pensions abroad, 130,627 pensioners were included under these agreements in 2010, with an average monthly pension of only 719.71 HRK (approximately €97). This is much less than the general average pension of 2,160 HRK (about €291) in January 2011, which itself represented only 40.45% of the average net wage. The pensions are low as they apply to workers with an average work record in Croatia of only 12 to 13 years, and to mainly lower skilled workers (Rismondo, 2011). There are no statistics available regarding the total amounts these workers receive in pensions from other countries. The totals and averages of different pensions paid by Croatia to those living abroad are shown in Table 8. As can be seen, there is a significant difference between pensions paid to those in successor states to SFRY compared to other countries. The breakdown of the numbers in these other countries is shown in Table 9, with the largest numbers of pensions being paid to those resident in Germany, followed by Australia (Rismondo, 2011).

Receiving a Croatian pension entitles the returning migrant to health insurance in Croatia. It may be that those who spent most of their working life abroad but who have returned to Croatia and cannot prove their entitlement to a Croatian pension, face problems in terms of health insurance. However, there are no figures on the extent of the problem. Although non-insured persons are entitled to free emergency medical treatment, other health fees for non-insured persons can be high and prohibitive. In addition, sources in the Croatian Pension Insurance Institute suggested that there were problems in accumulating records on who received pensions from abroad. In some cases, those lacking a Croatian pension may seek social assistance although, in reality, their income is boosted by a pension from abroad.

The numbers of those receiving pensions from abroad in Croatia in 2009 is shown in Table 10, with the largest numbers being from Bosnia-Herzegovina and from Germany<sup>21</sup>. The figures regarding Germany differ quite significantly from those provided by the German Pension Insurance fund. In 2009, a total of 105,299

<sup>20</sup> These are with: Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Macedonia, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.

<sup>21</sup> Administrative data compiled by the Croatian Pension Insurance Institute.

payments of pensions were made to those of Croatian nationality, a rise of some 5,700 from 2008, and almost 50,000 more than in 2000<sup>22</sup>. 67,591 of these payments were made to addresses in Croatia. German statistics include the amounts only for the years 2000–2002. In 2002, the average payment was €384.94, although all disability pensions and old age pensions for men were, on average, above this amount. The large numbers of those in receipt of pensions from Bosnia-Herzegovina is, without doubt, a product of war-time and post-war migration of Bosnian Croats with work records primarily or exclusively in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In contrast, those in receipt of pensions from Germany are, in large part, Croatian guest-workers who have returned to retire in Croatia. Hence, it is likely that the average pension paid from Germany will be significantly higher than the average Croatian pension, and, in contrast, that the average pension from Bosnia-Herzegovina will be considerably lower.

In reality, despite formal agreements, the regulation of social security contributions and entitlements between Croatia and both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia are complex, in the context of the wars. Croatian Serbs who between 1991 and 1995 worked in the part of Croatia which was not under the Croatian Government control (so-called Republic of Serbian Krajina or RSK) and who fled to either Serbia or Bosnia-Herzegovina, originally were given only a short period of time to validate their work records under a controversial 1997 Convalidation Law in Croatia (*Zakon o konvalidaciji*) (*Narodne novine*, no. 104/1997). This led to significant difficulties in realising pension rights in terms of those years. There is also an issue regarding those already receiving a Croatian pension who lived in the RSK in that period and who received, on the whole, only very small amounts from the para-state pension fund set up in that area. Also, those who had paid into the farmer's pension fund from its inception in 1980 until 1991, but who then stopped paying in 1991 because they lived in RSK, were originally not entitled to any benefits. This decision has now been amended but the back payments are determined by the time when a claim was made, with those having claimed before November 1999 receiving approximately three times the amount received by those who claimed afterwards. As part of agreements relating to minority rights, the period for claiming pensions from 1991 to 1995 was extended in 2008. The 2009 EU Progress Report on Croatia notes that 17,586 claims were made following the change, and that by November 2008 some 9,610 were processed with a 52% acceptance rate<sup>23</sup>. The 2010 Progress Report notes the possibility of appeals but also that the rejection rate remained high,

<sup>22</sup> Compiled from the Statistics of the German Pension Insurance Fund, Table 903.

<sup>23</sup> [http://www.eu-pregovori.hr/files/Izvjescje/Progress\\_report\\_2009.pdf](http://www.eu-pregovori.hr/files/Izvjescje/Progress_report_2009.pdf).

at 44%<sup>24</sup>. The latest, 2010 Croatia Progress Report notes “good progress” in terms of meeting the demands of the *acquis* regarding the co-ordination of social security systems but that “additional efforts” are needed in terms of building administrative capacity in this field. It also notes that Croatia is participating as an observer in a working group on new EU regulations on electronic exchange of data in this area.

### Poverty and social exclusion

The evidence on the linkages between emigration and poverty and social exclusion in Croatia is far from clear. The Household Budget Survey contains a category “money received (without the promise of returning it) from a long-term absent member of the household, family, or other person”. A category on “in-kind gifts” combines gifts from within the country and from abroad. Single parent households are, on the whole, likely to face a greater risk of poverty than the general population, a rate of 34% in 2010 compared with a general rate of 20.6%, with risk measured in terms of being below 60% of median income, based on the SLC methodology. However, there is no evidence of a linkage between this status and having a partner abroad (Grizelj and Akrap, 2011). The most recent World Bank poverty survey (*Croatia, 2007*) using 2004 HBS data and constructing a basic needs consumption basket poverty line, found a headline poverty rate of 11.1%, but a significantly higher risk for one or two person households, for large households (6 or more members) and for households aged 65 or over. Again, no data is available for poverty risk linked to having someone abroad.

It is extremely hard to posit any clear linkage between periods of significant emigration and trends in inequality in Croatia. The picture is complicated by the change from a socialist to a market based economy. An author noted that inequality in 1998 was lower than had been assumed (Nestić, 1998) but that there was a mild increase in inequality between 1998 and 2002 (Nestić, 2005), with the Gini coefficient having risen from 0.290 to 0.298<sup>25</sup>. He suggested that the Gini coefficient in 1988 was 0.276, so that the out-migration during the war coincided with an increase in inequality but this was more likely to have been a result of transition effects. Whilst “other income”, including remittances, was relatively constant between 1988 and 2000 (between 6.7% and 8.7% of total income) it fell considerably in 2002 to 3.7% but the reasons for this are far from clear and may be a statistical aberration. This broad pattern is verified by Leitner and Holzner’s study (2009), suggesting Croatia had a rather low and stable level of inequality throughout transition, calculating the

<sup>24</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key\\_documents/2010/package/hr\\_rapport\\_2010\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/hr_rapport_2010_en.pdf).

<sup>25</sup> The Gini coefficient measures income inequality and the range is from 0 (total equality) to 1 (total inequality).

Gini coefficient at between 0.280 and 0.300, although the fact that statistics do not include income from property sales, a source of considerable inequality, as income, from 2003 onwards, distorts the figures somewhat.

A longer-term focus on wage inequality, covering 1970 to 2006, a period chosen because of a remarkably consistent data set, also does not address migration issues even though it does discuss different political and economic turbulences (Bičanić and Vukoja, 2009). The rather counter-intuitive finding that wage dispersion, i.e. relative wages for different levels of education attainment, actually reduced over time, with particularly sharp reductions during periods of macro-economic instability during the early 1970s and early 1980s, is an important finding. The authors do not discuss the fact that these were also periods of significant labour emigration in Croatia, although they do make the point that there was internal labour mobility within what was then SFRY. Wage inequality, whilst largely cyclical, tended to increase over time with a steady increase since 2000. The fact that the shocks of war, large-scale forced migration and transition in the early 1990s had little effect on either measure of wage inequality, tends to support a hypothesis regarding the inflexibility of the Croatian labour market.

A recent study by Poprzenovic (2007), addressing the role of remittances on households in Croatia, suggests that most remittances were used for savings and investments, although no reasons are posited for why these may have been preferred to consumption expenditures. Her examination of household budget data, albeit with the problems noted above, suggests that single households of working age without children and single persons over 65 were the major recipients of remittances. Remittances have a poverty alleviation effect, even though the rich tend to receive more remittances in absolute terms, with the richest quintile receiving three times as much in remittances as the poorest quintile (Poprzenovic, 2007: 41). Whilst the poorest decile received only 4% of all remittances in 2002, the second poorest decile received 10%, more than middle-income groups. This decile received around 6% of all their income from remittances. The study shows that whilst remittances have a small poverty alleviation effect, they have a significant effect on the depth and severity of poverty, particularly in older single households. Their impact on inequality is small, reducing overall inequality in general, but tending to widen the gap between the richest and the poorest.

### **Labour market and human capital development in migration loss regions**

Whilst labour market trends are complex, there is evidence that the four migration loss counties had significantly lower activity rates in 2001 than the national picture. Indeed, the four counties were among the eleven whose activity rate was

below the national average, and including the two counties with the lowest activity rates (Ličko-senjska and Šibensko-kninska). All except Karlovačka had below average male activity rates and all had below average female activity rates, three of which were significantly lower than the national average (Živić and Pokos, 2005: 215–216). In terms of unemployment rates, using the definition of unemployed in the 2001 census<sup>26</sup>, all of the four net migration loss counties were among the nine counties with unemployment rates above the national average, including the highest rate: Šibensko-kninska (31.0%) compared to the Croatian overall rate of 20.4% (Živić and Pokos, 2005: 219). In the last decade, these net migration loss regions, with the exception of Sisačko-moslavačka county, have not been the hardest hit by unemployment. Rather, rates have increased in other war-affected counties such as Vukovarsko-srijemska, Virovitičko-podravska, and Brodsko-posavska. In the latest unemployment figures all four of these counties have registered unemployment rates of between 29.1% and 29.9%. Whilst unemployment rates are continuously high, and rise over the period, in both Sisačko-moslavačka and, to a lesser extent, in Karlovačka county, they fall in the other two counties over the period. In counties with lower rates initially, the impact of the crisis has been greatest, in part as a result of the fact that the crisis impacted most severely on the traditionally strong industrial regions of Croatia.

Hence, it is clear that those counties with the largest net migration loss between 1991 and 2001 are among the most deprived in terms of a number of broad indicators. There is some evidence, however, that in the last decade, particularly in terms of labour market trends, there has been more of a convergence between these counties and other war affected counties. In more general terms, regional inequalities between the four counties, other war-affected counties, and the rest of Croatia remain significant and may even be widening. The complex causal mechanisms for this are elaborated upon in Pejnović (2004) suggesting that there is a “vicious circle” of out migration of the most skilled and able; a change in the age structure of the work force in terms of an ageing population; a reduction in local markets through a reduction in purchasing power; a reduction in the size and quality of local services; a fall in investment; and a concomitant increase in the gap between core and peripheral areas. Others have noted, in addition, the slow pace of demining; the inefficiency of small local government units; the lack of reform in agriculture; and problems of waste water management (MAFRD, 2009: 158). This does seem to have been the pattern in terms of migration out of the four counties but also in terms of rural-urban migration, migration to the county centres, and migration from islands.

<sup>26</sup> Namely those without a job but actively seeking work in the last 12 months.

## Poverty and social exclusion in net migration loss regions

As noted earlier, there is little data on poverty, social exclusion and material deprivation broken down by county in Croatia. A study (Nestić and Vecchi, 2007) calculated county poverty rates by aggregating three years of HBS data (2002–2004). The study shows that two of the net migration loss regions have the highest county poverty rates in Croatia: Karlovačka at 33.8% and Sisačko-moslavačka at 28.3%. According to their study, whilst accounting for only 7.1% of Croatia's population, these counties account for 18.9% of the poor. The picture is more mixed regarding the other net migration loss counties. Šibensko-kninska has a rate only just above average at 13.6%; and Ličko-senjska with the lowest rate in the country at 2.5%, perhaps as a result of remittances (Nestić and Vecchi, 2007: 85). Although the nature of the urban/rural division is not made clear, using 2004 data, they state that urban poverty is 5.7% and rural poverty 17%, with almost 75% of Croatia's poor living in rural areas.

In terms of social exclusion, data from the first Croatian Quality of Life survey is the most useful but rather old. In terms of levels of deprivation, three of the net migration counties are in the six Croatian counties with the highest level of material deprivation. The only exception is Sisačko-moslavačka which is ranked joint tenth worst (*Kvaliteta života u Hrvatskoj*, 2007). In terms of housing, there is some suggestion that the migration loss counties have more problems, with the proportion with two out of four housing problems (lack of room; problems with door, windows and floors; problems of damp; lack of an indoor toilet) being 22% for Croatia as a whole but 28% in Ličko-senjska, 30% in Šibensko-kninska, and 34% in Karlovačka county. Sisačko-moslavačka county had a lower rate of 17%, with the worst affected county being Brodsko-posavska at 40%.

## Post-conflict refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs)

The wars that raged in the post-Yugoslav states in the 1990s created a massive crisis of forced migration, estimated to have directly affected up to 2.5 million people, with some 438,000 registered refugees in Croatia by November 1992 (Winter-Zlatković, 1995). In the complex conditions of war, combined with the uneven and contested nature of citizenship in the post-Yugoslav states, accurate numbers are hard to ascertain. What is clear is that the early 1990s saw a large flow of refugees into Croatia, and a large flow out of Croatia, both to neighbouring countries and to third countries. Many were granted only temporary stay until it was deemed safe to return. It is also important that whilst many Bosnian Croats who fled Bosnia-Herzegovina obtained Croatian citizenship and settled in Croatia, Croatian Serbs who fled to Serbia were, often, not granted citizenship.

After Croatia retook territory in 1995, the first wave of returnees included ethnic Croats, both IDPs and refugees, although many Bosnian Croats also settled in the newly reintegrated territories. The return of Croatian Serbs was not on the political agenda until after 2000, when commitment to this became a key test of Croatia's progress on accession to the European Union. Even here, numbers of registered returnees appear to include a significant number of those who retain an address elsewhere and may visit their reclaimed property rather than live in it. Based on a sample of returnees, one study suggests that as many as 50% may not be living at the registered return address (Mesić and Bagić, 2007). The study also found that more return was to small rural areas where returnees may be able to work the land and that returnees tended to be older and less well educated.

Total registered returns to Croatia between 2000 and 2009, according to UNHCR, is some 109,174 persons, with numbers decreasing every year to only 718 persons in 2009. By January 2010, there were 28,115 "persons of concern to UNHCR" in Croatia, including 2,285 IDPs. Whilst figures for 2010 are not yet available, the number of IDPs is very small, compared to its peak of 250,000 in 1995, including some 32,000 ethnic Serbs. Out of the 2,285, it has been suggested that 1,600 are ethnic Serbs still waiting to return to their property. In addition, there are 1,133 refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, and 22,583 persons categorised as "others of concern", meaning returnees without a final eligibility decision. Out of the total of returnees, the overwhelming majority came from Serbia (85.8%). There are still some 71,121 refugees from Croatia in the region, mainly in Serbia (87.1%), suggesting that of all those who fled Croatia during the wars, many have not returned a decade and a half later.

Whilst most Croatian IDPs have returned, the main problem still concerns ethnic Serb returns, with many international organizations and human rights NGOs suggesting that almost half of Serb returns to and within Croatia are not sustainable. Whilst both Croat and Serb actual and potential returnees face the problems of the poor economic situation in return areas, compounded by problems of the continued existence of landmines, ethnic Serbs face continuing discrimination in accessing housing, property and employment. Implementation of legislation in areas such as property repossession, housing, reconstruction and access to citizenship has been slow. Ethnic Serb returnees face, therefore, limited access to property, utilities, education, employment, as well as occasional threats to security and, above all, a lack of social cohesion and opportunity for reintegration. One continuing barrier has been the absence of a remedy for the arbitrary cancellation of tenancy rights for former occupiers of socially owned apartments which occurred in the 1990s. This mainly affected ethnic Serbs and, in particular, those in manual work in urban areas.



Alternative housing options have been made available to those who wish to return, but many have been left without any durable housing solutions or compensation for the loss of their tenancy rights. A UNHCR study indicates that up to half of Serb IDP and refugee returnees left the country or resettled elsewhere within Croatia (Mesić and Bagić, 2007). Their sample also shows the impact of poor economic prospects and high unemployment on return. Some 37% of returnees in their study were over 65, compared to only 17% of the population as a whole, and children were only 12%, half the figure in the general population. Over time, whilst institutional obstacles have been removed, there has been a noticeable absence of any meaningful incentives encouraging return (Harvey, 2006).

## **Roma**

Whilst in the 2001 census only 9,463 persons or 0.21% of the population of Croatia, declared themselves to be Roma, best estimates from the Council of Europe, quoted in a 2004 report (Hrvatić, 2004) are that the true Roma population is between 30,000 and 40,000, or around 1% of the total Croatian population, although some Roma associations have suggested figures between 60,000 and even 150,000 (Hrvatić, 2004). Roma are present in 15 counties in Croatia, most significantly in Međimurska county in north of Croatia, where, according to estimates (Novak et al., 2011), up to 30% of the total Croatian Roma live, then in Varaždinska county, in Osječko-baranjska county and in settlements on the edge of Zagreb. Most Roma live in separated settlements, on the outskirts of urban centres or in rural areas, with the size of settlement between 200 and 1,000 people (ERRC, 1998), with the majority of Roma reportedly living in one of 25 such settlements (Novak et al., 2011). Whilst old research suggests that 51% of Croatia's Roma population were born where they now live, 17% moved within Croatia, and 32% moved into Croatia from elsewhere (Ivanov, 2006), there is a lack of current data. Nevertheless, the break-up of Yugoslavia and the wars led to many Roma moving to Croatia from other former Yugoslav Republics and many Roma leaving Croatia. A consequence of the break-up of Yugoslavia is that a significant number of Roma in Croatia lack Croatian citizenship, in part as a result of never having held a republic passport and partly as a result of strict and probably discriminatory Croatian citizenship requirements. Whilst UNHCR estimates that up to 1,000 Croatian Roma may be at risk of statelessness (UNHCR, 2010), it is likely that a significantly larger number have some citizenship but not Croatian.

There is a clear and consistent evidence of the systematic over-representation of Croatian Roma amongst those suffering from poverty and social exclusion. Data from a large UNDP sample survey from 2004 showed rates of poverty amongst

Roma much higher than the general population but, significantly, also from the population living in close proximity to Roma, with Roma poverty rates at 12% compared to 2% for the majority population in close proximity. Crucially, the depth of poverty was also significantly greater. Unemployment rates, using LFS definitions, for Roma in the sample ranged from 35% for the 25–54 age group to 52% for those 15–24 and over 55 (Ivanov, 2006: 21). Unemployment rates for women were higher than for men except for the 55 and over age group, where male unemployment reached 57%. A micro-study of employment of Roma in Zagreb and Međimurje (Novak, Feldman and Tomljenović, 2007) found that of those registered as unemployed in Međimurje, 17% were Roma, although they make up, officially, only 2.4% of the population or, unofficially, about 5%. A similar 400% over-representation of Roma amongst the unemployed was found in Zagreb (Novak, Feldman and Tomljenović, 2007: 14). Many Roma settlements lack electricity and adequate water, sewage and drainage facilities. There is no clear data on the proportion of Roma who have one or more family member abroad nor whether these Roma live better, as a result of remittances, or worse, as a result of loss of a breadwinner, than their peers. It is likely that many Roma households continue to function across national borders.

## POLICY RESPONSES

Migration policy in Croatia from 2010 onwards is founded on two assumptions: that in the period up to 2061 the regional migration component of the change in the number and dynamics of population in Croatia would be substantial (Grizelj and Akrap, 2011: 21–22); and that both the demographic and economic development of Croatia cannot be observed in isolation from neighbouring countries. Estimates of net migration for several decades ahead are based on the presumption that the present relations between Croatia and its wider surroundings will be unchanged. Such a projection implies that Croatia will retain low (from 0.5 in 2010 to 1.4 in 2041) variant of migration balance, slightly positive in the period 2010–2041. Only for the period 2016–2021 a slight negative (-0.1) migration balance is projected. This would indicate that statisticians assume stronger emigration flows after Croatia joins the EU in 2013. Croatia's Migration Policy for 2007/8 (*Migracijska politika Republike Hrvatske za 2007./2008. godinu*) (*Narodne novine*, no. 83/2007) was subjected to considerable criticism, even by experts from the Ministry of the Interior, suggesting that it was “too descriptive and lacks directions for implementation” (Hrlić, 2009: 178). At the end of the last Parliament, a new Law on the Relations between the Republic of Croatia and the Croats Living outside the Republic of Croatia (*Zakon o odnosima Republike Hrvatske s Hrvatima izvan Republike Hrvatske*) (*Narodne novine*, no. 124/2011) was passed in October 2011, together with a broader strategy

document (MFA, 2011).

### Encouragement of circular migration

Bilateral arrangements between the Croatian Employment Service and respective agencies in Germany from 2002 to 2010 fulfil some of the conditions for circular migration, including employment of guest workers for up to 18 months (Sporazum između Vlade Republike Hrvatske i Vlade Savezne Republike Njemačke o zapošljavanju radnika radi usavršavanja njihovog profesionalnog i jezičnog znanja /Sporazum o radnicima na privremenom radu/) (*Narodne novine*, Međunarodni ugovori, no. 14/2002). The number agreed from 2002–2010 was just 1,275 guest workers employed in Germany.<sup>27</sup> The Treaty on Croatia's Accession to the European Union (14509/11), allows for Austria and Germany to set limits on temporary workers from Croatia in some sectors, including construction. As regards the nursing professions, a specific bilateral agreement between the German and Croatian employment agencies enables the employment of Croatian skilled workers in the field of nursing and elderly care in Germany on the basis of specific demands expressed from the side of employers. Conditions for employment in Germany are the accomplishment of an officially recognised vocational education in the field of nursing or elderly care in Croatia (or other states of former Yugoslavia before 1991) and good knowledge of the German language. The bilateral agreement foresees a close joint cooperation of both employment agencies for the process of selection and recruitment of each worker in the frame of a standardised and supervised contracting process<sup>28</sup>. Besides this, it is required from the Croatian professionals that they introduce a request for the recognition of their formal qualifications in Germany during the first year of their employment in Germany.

Under an initiative of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), a Migration Information Centre (MIC) was opened under the auspices of the Croatian Employment Service in 2008. Subsequently, centres were also opened in Split, Rijeka, and Osijek<sup>29</sup>. The centres offer advice and guidance to migrants and potential migrants. From January 2010, responsibility for all aspects of the centres passed

<sup>27</sup> <http://www.hzz.hr/print.aspx?ID=6175&proiz=>

<sup>28</sup> Employment of Croatian personnel within the framework of this programme is open only to institutionalised employers, not to private households in Germany. The minimum working period proposed to the Croatian worker must be one year. The working contract in German and Croatian language has a standardised form and must comply with German regulations and existing collective agreements as regards wages and working conditions. The Croatian professionals are recruited twice a year in the frame of personal interviews undertaken by officials of the Croatian and German employment agencies. Exempted from the interview are candidates who already hold a recognition of their qualification as nurse or elderly carer from the German competent authorities. Source: among others ZAV – Zentrale Auslands- und Fachvermittlung, Bonn, January 2005.

<sup>29</sup> See <http://www.migrantservicecentres.org>.

to the CES. In the nine month period between June 2008 and February 2009, 313 people visited the centres, 247 seeking migration, including 114 with a prior history of migration. On average, users were aged 33, 70% were unemployed and, compared to users in other parts of the Western Balkans, users tended to have fewer dependants (Flinterman, 2009).

As early as 2005, the Ministry of Science, Education and Sports launched the Unity through Knowledge Fund<sup>30</sup> to enhance cooperation between Croatia and Croatian top scientists in the Diaspora. The broad aim of the UKF scheme is to promote common projects between Croatian researchers in Croatia and those abroad. Initial funding was some €5 m. to promote scientific and technological development and ensure that know-how remains in Croatian ownership. In the period from December 2007 until March 2011, 80 scientific and technological projects were launched, 30 of which are still ongoing with funds committed some €5.3 m. In the same period 299 project proposals were submitted to all UKF Fund Programs and the overall funds requested were about €30 m., suggesting that there is a large demand for such programmes. The run-up to the referendum on EU membership prompted renewed debate on the loss of skilled labour and the need for policies which promote mobility of skilled labour and which encourage the return of students and scientists from abroad.

## Return of Diaspora

A New Law on the Relations between the Republic of Croatia and the Croatians Living outside the Republic of Croatia, passed at the end of October 2011 by the Parliament, allows for Croatians in the Diaspora to continue to be given Croatian citizenship, whilst extending the time which foreigners need to live in Croatia before being eligible. The Law is vague as to whether it means all those with some links to Croatia or only ethnicised Croats. The Law obliges the Government to strengthen and develop economic and cultural ties with the Diaspora<sup>31</sup>.

The goals are: to put in motion a new legislative and institutional framework for the implementation of the Strategy, to establish a central authority in charge of the relations with Diaspora, and to establish the Council of the Government for Croatians outside of Croatia. The Council will include, among others, representatives of all three groups of Croatian Diaspora. Some specific tasks of the Council would include encouragement and support to Croatian emigrants in establishing

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<sup>30</sup> See <http://www.ukf.hr>.

<sup>31</sup> Under the Diaspora, the Law includes “Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina (presently about 400,000), members of Croatian minorities in 12 European countries (about 350,000), and Croats who emigrated overseas and their offspring (about 3 million)” (*Narodne novine*, no. 124/11: 1).

cooperation with local institutions and authorities in the countries they live in and economic, educational and scientific cooperation with Croatian scientists and businessmen outside of Croatia.

In the field of “circulation” of migrants, the Strategy aims to attract specific groups of emigrants such as “established scientists” and “pupils and students”. The return of emigrants and their offspring, modelled on other immigration countries, will become a priority (MFA, 2011: 11). In order to monitor the processes of cooperation and return of young and established scientists, the Government will introduce a programme of monitoring through “mentor-counsellors”, and put in place a permanent programme of “virtual mentorship” and cooperation with a view “to transferring the necessary know-how” (MFA: 11) between established scientists of Croatian origin and students and teachers in Croatia.

### **Rural development**

In terms of rural development, Croatia has benefitted from the SAPARD and later IPA-RD programme and elaborated an Agriculture and Rural Development Plan for 2007–2013 (MAFRD, 2009). This complements a number of Government programmes underpinned by a Law on Agriculture (Zakon o izmjenama i dopunama Zakona o poljoprivredi) (*Narodne novine*, no. 83/2002), and the Law on State Aid in Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (Zakon o izmjenama i dopunama Zakona o državnoj potpori u poljoprivredi, ribarstvu i šumarstvu) (*Narodne novine*, no. 141/2006). Together, they cover four schemes, one rather large, a production subsidies scheme, and three smaller, covering income support, capital investment grants, and rural development. The rural development scheme covers general rural development, as well as support for product marketing and protected breeds. The scheme covers a wide range of activities including infrastructure development, support to young farmers, and promotion of rural tourism. Again, the impact of the programme on net migration loss rural areas is unclear, although the IPA-RD report notes the deep structural problems facing rural development in Croatia, and the fact that implementation is, again, weakened by poor co-ordination between key stakeholders and policy actors and, crucially, “the weak activity or non-existence of regional and local institutions competent for rural development” (MAFRD, 2009; 200). The problem is, of course, compounded by the fact that there is a need to modernise agriculture through mechanisation and consolidation of farm sizes in Croatia as well as the need to control subsidies in the context of both fiscal discipline and EU accession and the alignment with the CAP. Whilst, in the longer-term, this objective is likely to improve rural development for all, in the short term it itself may result in negative social impacts which are not being addressed in Government

policy to the extent that may be needed, including further loss of the most active and skilled part of the rural population.

By far the most significant support comes from the European Union's IPA programmes with two of the five programmes focussing specifically on regional development and rural development, to an indicative value of €72.8m. or 47.4% of the total IPA programming in 2010. In addition, the programme on Cross-border co-operation is worth some €15.6m. To the best of our knowledge, none of the initiatives are specifically focused on issues of migration although many can be seen to be linked to the goal of reducing the depopulation of underdeveloped regions and rural areas through improved quality of life and enhanced livelihoods.

## **KEY CHALLENGES AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **Key challenges of the social impact of emigration and internal migration**

The analysis thus far has suggested that there are a number of important challenges faced by Croatia in terms of the social impacts of emigration. Firstly, Croatia has still not developed strong links between migration data, analysis and evidence-based policy making, particularly in terms of the social dimension. Migration Policy has been rather fitful, vague, and has lacked clear vision and capacity. There has been poor co-ordination of stakeholders in relation to migration issues. Croatia does not yet have a clear, consistent and credible migration policy which is fit for purpose in terms of managing migration inflows and outflows in the context of labour market needs. There is a lack of clear labour market analysis and hence a mismatch between the needs for labour and a clear encouragement of different forms of migration to meet those needs. This is most apparent in some key high value sectors of the Croatian economy. In addition, whilst return emigration is generally seen as welcome in Croatia, this is largely for demographic reasons. Hence, there has been no real preparation for the fact that there is a potential wave of returnees of an older generation of guest workers who have spent a considerable time abroad.

Secondly, whilst, in part as a condition of EU accession, there have been more consistent and consolidated efforts to facilitate the sustainable return of Croatian Serbs who left as a result of war events in the 1990s, much remains to be done to ensure that basic employment, housing, residence, and social protection systems are in place, as well as a more rigorous enforcement of anti-discrimination legislation.

A third issue concerns the fact that, whilst efforts have been made to limit the loss of well qualified Croatian scientists and professionals abroad, and to create conditions for their sustainable return, more may need to be done, particularly in

the context of Croatia's impending membership of the European Union. We have also identified that those children who have one or both parents working abroad and/or whose schooling takes place both abroad and in Croatia, whilst numbers are not known, face potential problems in terms of their psycho-social adjustment, reintegration and educational attainment which are not sufficiently addressed at the policy level.

In terms of the social impacts of internal, rural-urban, and spatially specific migration and in terms of net migration loss regions, a key challenge also relates to the absence of sound regional labour market analysis and planning, so there is a real danger that some of the more disadvantaged parts of Croatia, namely the war affected, net migration loss and rural areas, will fall further behind in terms of economic and social indicators, causing an intensification of a vicious circle of out-migration of a significant part of the active, educated and productive population. In this context, the problems of isolated older people locked in poverty and social exclusion with little or no family support in these same areas, are likely to worsen in the medium-term unless remedial action is taken. This applies, particularly, to returnees of Serbian ethnicity who fled during the war. The vulnerability of Roma communities in relation to one or more of their family members living abroad has not been addressed sufficiently either in research or in policy.

### **Policy suggestions**

In terms of the policy implications of these key challenges, there is a clear need for improved data gathering and, crucially, analysis of migration trends in Croatia. The 2011 census provides an opportunity for the elaboration, as soon as possible, by responsible experts, of reliable statistics related to return, internal mobility, immigration and emigration. On the basis of this, a new long-term Migration Policy (for 10 years) and medium-term Action Plan (5 years) should be produced, based on different migration scenarios. This should be led by a clearly designated and competent central body, appointed by Government or Parliament, which can liaise with the European Union and destination countries on a bilateral basis, becoming a centre for reliable and timely migration policy development and monitoring of its implementation. Such a body will need to co-ordinate and consult with all stakeholders with an interest in the issue of migration in Croatia. The body should prioritise studies and actions to mitigate the negative social impacts of migration.

Relevant policy makers need to address two different groups. The first are those target populations which are now, and are likely in the future, to be involved in external mobility. Advice and support in terms of maximizing the possibilities for migration and return will be needed for the young and highly educated, particu-

larly women, not just those who have qualification which fit with emerging EU labour market demands, but also those graduates and post-graduates who have non-complementary qualifications, including those in the humanities fields. The second group are those left behind who may be at risk of poverty and social exclusion as a direct or indirect result of migration. Here, there is a need for a clear focus on vulnerable groups in the context of migration in the development of social inclusion and active employment policies, including older people, children, and minorities. Collaboration between NGOs working on these issues and governmental bodies will be needed in the future.

Whilst there is limited capacity within counties, there is a need to improve investments, particularly in net migration loss areas, targeting those skills which are needed, targeting those most at risk of leaving, and promoting entrepreneurship, particularly of women. Besides, closer linkages between Employment and Social Welfare services are needed. In addition, the development of more Migration Information Centres may be considered. Perhaps even more importantly, stronger linkages between the Diaspora and domestic development agencies need to be developed in order to explore ways of channelling remittances for development. The new Law on the Diaspora will be useful if the institutional arrangements relate to all Croatian citizens and potential citizens living outside Croatia.

Concerted effort needs to be made by the Croatian government and development partners to ensure the sustainable return of all Croatian Serbs who wish to return, through increased funding for reconstruction, rigorous implementation of anti-discrimination policies and employment programmes, and the removal of remaining barriers to return. Expanding the work of bodies like the Unity Through Knowledge Fund is needed to create improved conditions for the return of qualified Croatian scientists abroad and enhanced links between scientists abroad and those in Croatia is a necessary but not sufficient condition to halt the loss of Croatian scientists abroad. More investment in science in Croatia will also be needed.

In addition, The European Union, through its social funds, needs to prioritise migration related issues in the fields of employment, through supporting initiatives to promote circular migration, as well as supporting social inclusion programmes specifically concerned with those who are at risk as a result of migration. There needs to be much more emphasis on the social dimension of rural and regional development programmes. As EU membership approaches, there is a clear need to develop a “third arm” of migration policy beyond unilateral policies based on national sovereignty and binding agreements within the EU, in terms of a flexible, and non-binding, regional focus in relation to neighbouring non-EU member states in South East Europe. A regional approach will need to involve a wide range of



stakeholders in pro-active encouragement of circular migration including student mobility. Through exchange of information and good practices in the field of common policies in labour mobility, practical solutions could be developed which tap into some of the available labour in the region, including young educated unemployed or semi-employed women and men who would benefit from being informed and possibly navigated through availability of migration incentives. Crucially, there would be a need to explore more flexible social protection policies to maximise the possibilities of circular mobility for these groups.

Finally, studies are needed urgently into those issues where there is insufficient information at this stage to make clear policy recommendations. These include: children left behind or being educated in different countries; intentions of the older generation of guest workers to return and their social conditions; the problems in practice with bilateral social security agreements; and the nature and problems of migration of Roma.

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
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## FIGURES AND TABLES

Figure 1: Total and dependent population, Croatia according to Medium Fertility/ Medium Migration Projection



Source: CBS, reproduced in Švaljek and Nestić, 2008: 57.

*Table 1: Crude rate of net migration plus adjustment, Croatia 1990–2010 (per 1,000 persons)*

<b>Year</b>	<b>Net migration</b>
1990	1.3
1991	-39.1
1992	- 7.7
1993	19.9
1994	3.1
1995	-16.7
1996	-11.3
1997	0.1
1998	-0.9
1999	-5.1
2000	-11.7
2001	3.2
2002	1.9
2003	2.7
2004	2.6
2005	1.9
2006	1.6
2007	1.3
2008	1.6
2009	-0.3
2010	-1.1

*Source: Eurostat. (The indicator is defined as the ratio of net migration plus adjustment during the year to the average population in that year; expressed per 1 000 inhabitants. The net migration plus adjustment is the difference between the total change and the natural change of the population).*

*<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tsdde230> (date of extraction; 20.10.2011)*

*Table 2: International migration of population of Croatia, 2000–2010*

<b>Year</b>	<b>Immigrants</b>	<b>Emigrants</b>	<b>Net migration</b>
2000.	29 385	5 953	23 432
2001.	24 415	7 488	16 927
2002.	20 365	11 767	8 598
2003.	18 455	6 534	11 921
2004.	18 383	6 812	11 571
2005.	14 230	6 012	8 218
2006.	14 978	7 692	7 286
2007.	14 622	9 002	5 620
2008.	14 541	7 488	7 053
2009.	8 468	9 940	-1 472
2010.	4 985	9 860	-4 875

*Sources: Migration of Population of Republic of Croatia 2009, First Release, Vol. XLVII, No 7.1.2., 26 May 2010; Migration of Population of Republic of Croatia 2010, First Release, Vol. XLVIII, No 7.1.2., 15 June 2011, <http://www.dzs.hr> (extracted 21.10.2011)*

*Table 3: International migration, by country of previous residence and citizenship (2009; selected data)*

<b>Country of previous residence/destination</b>	<b>Immigrants</b>		<b>Emigrants</b>	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>Croatian citizens</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Croatian citizens</b>
Total	8,468	7,621	9,940	8,637
EU	1,739	1,534	982	978
Austria	220	199	292	289
Germany	733	677	459	458
Slovenia	356	307	110	110
Former Yu*	5,756	5,308	6,199	6,021
BiH	4,874	4,561	1,666	1,659
Serbia	755	671	4,458	4,293



Country of previous residence/destination	Immigrants		Emigrants	
	Total	Croatian citizens	Total	Croatian citizens
Others	127	76	75	69
Switzerland	244	240	35	34

*\*Without Slovenia*

Source: Croatian Bureau of Statistics. Migration of Population of RH in 2009, First Release, Vol. XLVII, No 7.1.2. 26 May 2010, [http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv\\_Eng/publication/2010/07-01-02\\_01\\_2010.htm](http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv_Eng/publication/2010/07-01-02_01_2010.htm)

Table 4: International migration, by country of previous residence and citizenship (2010; selected data)

Country of previous residence/destination	Immigrants		Emigrants	
	Total	Croatian citizens	Total	Croatian citizens
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,985</b>	<b>4,176</b>	<b>9,860</b>	<b>9,623</b>
EU	997	842	1,697	1,689
Austria	115	106	410	410
Germany	456	414	775	773
Slovenia	356	307	110	110
Former Yu*	3,035	2,506	6,690	6,582
BiH	2,589	2,161	3,549	3,542
Serbia	371	308	3,044	2,949
Others	75	37	97	91
Switzerland	159	156	140	140

*\*Without Slovenia*

Source: Croatian Bureau of Statistics. Migration of Population of RH in 2010, First Release, Vol. XLVIII, No 7.1.2. 15 June 2011,

[http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv\\_Eng/publication/2011/07-01-02\\_01\\_2011.htm](http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv_Eng/publication/2011/07-01-02_01_2011.htm)

Table 5: Foreign population from Croatia in Germany, 2002–2009

	<b>Total</b>	<b>Men</b>	<b>% of Women</b>
2002.	230,987	117,222	49.3
2003.	236,570	118,783	49.8
2004.	229,172	113,433	50.5
2005.	228,926	112,616	50.8
2006.	227,510	111,826	50.8
2007.	225,309	110,387	51.0
2008.	223,056	108,798	51.2
2009.	221,222	107,464	51.4


Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 2009.: 26–31.

Table 6: Foreign population from Croatia in Germany in 2009, by age (in %)

<b>Age</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Men</b>	<b>Women</b>
>10	1.4	1.0	1.7
10-15	3.7	3.9	3.4
15-20	3.3	3.5	3.2
20-25	4.7	5.0	4.6
25-35	18.7	18.6	18.8
35-45	18.1	18.2	18.1
45-55	11.3	9.6	13.0
55-65	24.4	23.6	25.3
65-75	11.0	13.1	9.4
75 – more	2.4	2.2	2.6
N	221,222	107,464	113,758

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 2009: 36–37

Figure 2: Remittances as % of GDP (1993–2009)



Source: World Bank Remittances Handbook, 2011

Table 7: Pensions paid abroad, 2010

Type	Number of beneficiaries	Average payment
<b>General Pension</b>		
In countries of former SFRY	85,944	1,166.72 HRK €157.88
Other countries	23,718	653.92 HRK €88.49
<b>Pensions of Police and Army Administration (VO, MUP)</b>		
In countries of former SFRY	32	5,114.49 HRK €692.08
Other countries	3	4,645.52 HRK €628.62
<b>Veterans' Pensions</b>		
In countries of former SFRY	2,839	7,126.34 HRK €964.32
Other countries	14	6,227.05 HRK €842.63

Type	Number of beneficiaries	Average payment
<b>Bosnian Croat Army Pensions</b>		
In countries of former SFRY	4,431	2,585.68 HRK €349.89
Other countries	3	1,501.38 HRK €203.16

*Source: Rismondo (2011); December 2010 €1=7.39 HRK*

*Table 8: Beneficiaries of pensions abroad, without ex-Yugoslavia*

Country	Number	% of Total
Austria	1,680	6.9%
Czech Republic	203	0.8%
France	657	4.6%
Germany	12,216	50.1%
Italy	1,243	5.1%
Netherlands	258	1.1%
Sweden	439	1.8%
Switzerland	290	1.2%
Other Europe	332	1.4%
Australia	5,332	21.8%
Canada	1,440	5.9%
USA	288	1.2%
Other Countries	26	0.1%
Total	24,404	

*Source: Rismondo (2011)*

Table 9: Beneficiaries in receipt of pensions from abroad (2009)

Country	No. of beneficiaries by type				Total
	Old age	Disability	Family	Other	
Austria	5,856	2,838	5,222	-	13,916
Germany	49,932	3,264	27,280	539	81,015
Switzerland	2,118	1,003	499	-	3,620
Bosnia and Herzegovina	75,575	33,135	44,170	-	152,880
Macedonia	260	95	93	-	448
Slovenia	9,299	3,875	5,843	-	19,017
Serbia and Montenegro	2,737	1,170	1,566	102	5,575

*Source: Croatian Pension and Insurance Institute (2011)*

Silva MEŽNARIĆ, Paul STUBBS

## **Društveni utjecaji emigracije i migracija selo–grad u Hrvatskoj: 1991. – 2011.**

### SAŽETAK

U radu se istražuju društveni utjecaji emigracije i migracija selo–grad u Hrvatskoj, posebice između 1991. i 2011. U tom razdoblju u Hrvatskoj je došlo do kretanja stanovništva potaknutoga ratnim i poratnim događajima, nakon čega je nastupilo razdoblje normalizacije migracijskih tokova. U radu se detaljno istražuju radne migracije i njihov utjecaj na tržišta rada u kontekstu nedostatka kvalificirane radne snage u Hrvatskoj. Osim toga rad ispituje ulogu doznaka i socijalnih sporazuma. Nakon rasprave o problemima institucionalne potpore i migracijske politike autori daju niz preporuka kreatorima politike za smanjivanje društvenih troškova migracija kako bi one pridonijele društvenom razvoju.

**KLJUČNE RIJEČI:** emigracija, unutarnja migracija, društveni utjecaji, tržište rada, Hrvatska